Dr Richard Gray BSc (Open), MPhil (Cantab), PhD (Edin)
Senior Lecturer
School of English, Communication and Philosophy
- GrayR@cardiff.ac.uk
- +44 29208 75416
- John Percival Building, Room 1.33, Colum Drive, Cardiff, CF10 3EU
Overview
I am part of the School's Philosophy group.
Publication
2022
- Gray, R. 2022. Thermal perception and its relation to touch. Philosophers' Imprint (10.3998/phimp.2547)
2020
- Allen, C., Viola, T., Irvine, E., Sedgmond, J., Castle, H., Gray, R. and Chambers, C. D. 2020. Causal manipulation of feed-forward and recurrent processing differentially affects measures of consciousness. Neuroscience of Consciousness 2020(1), article number: niaa015. (10.1093/nc/niaa015)
2019
- Gray, R. 2019. On the content and character of pain experience. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100(1), pp. 47-68. (10.1111/papq.12261)
2014
- Gray, R. 2014. Pain, perception and the sensory modalities: revisiting the intensive theory. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5, pp. 87-101. (10.1007/s13164-014-0177-4)
2013
- Gray, R. 2013. What do our experiences of heat and cold represent?. Philosophical Studies 166(1 Supp), pp. 131-151. (10.1007/s11098-012-0083-5)
- Gray, R. 2013. Is there a space of sensory modalities?. Erkenntnis 78(6), pp. 1259-1273. (10.1007/s10670-012-9409-0)
2011
- Gray, R. 2011. On the nature of the senses. In: Macpherson, F. ed. The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 243-260.
2010
- Gray, R. and Tanesini, A. 2010. Perception and action: The taste test. Philosophical Quarterly 60(241), pp. 718-734. (10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.651.x)
- Gray, R. 2010. An argument for nonreductive representationalism. American Philosophical Quarterly 47(4), pp. 365-376.
2006
- Gray, R. 2006. Natural phenomenon terms. Analysis 66(290), pp. 141-148. (10.1111/j.1467-8284.2006.00602.x)
2005
- Gray, R. 2005. On the concept of a sense. Synthese 147(3), pp. 461-475. (10.1007/s11229-005-1334-1)
2004
- Gray, R. 2004. What synaesthesia really tell us about functionalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11(9), pp. 64-69.
2003
- Gray, R. 2003. Tye's representationalism: Feeling the heat?. Philosophical Studies 115(3), pp. 245-256. (10.1023/A:1025129319705)
2001
- Gray, R. 2001. Cognitive modules, synaesthesia and the constitution of psychological natural kinds. Philosophical Psychology 14(1), pp. 65-82. (10.1080/09515080120033562)
Adrannau llyfrau
- Gray, R. 2011. On the nature of the senses. In: Macpherson, F. ed. The Senses: Classic and Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 243-260.
Erthyglau
- Gray, R. 2022. Thermal perception and its relation to touch. Philosophers' Imprint (10.3998/phimp.2547)
- Allen, C., Viola, T., Irvine, E., Sedgmond, J., Castle, H., Gray, R. and Chambers, C. D. 2020. Causal manipulation of feed-forward and recurrent processing differentially affects measures of consciousness. Neuroscience of Consciousness 2020(1), article number: niaa015. (10.1093/nc/niaa015)
- Gray, R. 2019. On the content and character of pain experience. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100(1), pp. 47-68. (10.1111/papq.12261)
- Gray, R. 2014. Pain, perception and the sensory modalities: revisiting the intensive theory. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5, pp. 87-101. (10.1007/s13164-014-0177-4)
- Gray, R. 2013. What do our experiences of heat and cold represent?. Philosophical Studies 166(1 Supp), pp. 131-151. (10.1007/s11098-012-0083-5)
- Gray, R. 2013. Is there a space of sensory modalities?. Erkenntnis 78(6), pp. 1259-1273. (10.1007/s10670-012-9409-0)
- Gray, R. and Tanesini, A. 2010. Perception and action: The taste test. Philosophical Quarterly 60(241), pp. 718-734. (10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.651.x)
- Gray, R. 2010. An argument for nonreductive representationalism. American Philosophical Quarterly 47(4), pp. 365-376.
- Gray, R. 2006. Natural phenomenon terms. Analysis 66(290), pp. 141-148. (10.1111/j.1467-8284.2006.00602.x)
- Gray, R. 2005. On the concept of a sense. Synthese 147(3), pp. 461-475. (10.1007/s11229-005-1334-1)
- Gray, R. 2004. What synaesthesia really tell us about functionalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 11(9), pp. 64-69.
- Gray, R. 2003. Tye's representationalism: Feeling the heat?. Philosophical Studies 115(3), pp. 245-256. (10.1023/A:1025129319705)
- Gray, R. 2001. Cognitive modules, synaesthesia and the constitution of psychological natural kinds. Philosophical Psychology 14(1), pp. 65-82. (10.1080/09515080120033562)
Research
Much time and effort has been expended on philosophical questions related to vision, visual perception and visual experience. The assumption has tended to be that what goes for vision can be straightforwardly applied to the other senses.
Much of my work has focused on other senses and sensory processes which have received little attention in the philosophical literature. My PhD thesis, and a number of published papers drawn from it, focused on synaesthesia.
I have also written papers on heat perception, which, so I have argued, can shed light on the nature of perceptual experience. In a recent paper co-authored with Alessandra Tanesini, we have looked at the distinctive nature of taste perception in the context of enactive accounts of perception. All of these have been used to motivate a more general account of the senses.
Research interests
- Philosophy of perception
- Philosophy of mind
- Philosophy of language
Teaching
Current Undergraduate teaching
- Philosophy of Language
- Topics in Metaphysics
- Philosophy of Mind
- Contemporary Epistemology
Current Postgraduate teaching
- Philosophy of Mind Epistemology
Biography
Richard Gray came to Cardiff in 2004. From 2000-4 he was a lecturer in philosophy at Trinity College Dublin. Prior to that he was at the University of Edinburgh, where he completed his PhD, having previously studied at the University of Cambridge.