![Sophie Archer](https://profiles-cardiff.imgix.net/attachments/117?w=200&h=200&auto=format&crop=faces&fit=crop&q=90")
Dr Sophie Archer
(she/her)
Senior Lecturer in Philosophy
School of English, Communication and Philosophy
- Available for postgraduate supervision
Overview
My primary research interests are in philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, and epistemology.
To date, I have been particularly concerned with what it is to believe something. My work on this question touches upon issues to do with epistemic normativity, agency, and irrationality and psychopathology. I am currently collecting my thoughts (some of which have already been published or are under review in article form) into a book manuscript.
I have also published an edited collection on the topic of salience. Salience is central to human life, yet is relatively underexplored as a philosophical topic. In my collection, I draw together a number of contributions from across a wide philosophical spectrum – including epistemology, philosophy of perception, philosophy of language, philosophy of psychology, practical reason, feminist philosophy, and aesthetics – in the hope that understanding more about the role of salience in these different areas will facilitate an understanding of what salience is.
Publication
2024
- Archer, S. 2024. Why do you believe that?. In: Sullivan-Bissett, E. ed. Belief, Imagination, and Delusion. Oxford University Press, pp. 227-239., (10.1093/oso/9780198872221.003.0011)
- Archer, S. 2024. Why do you believe that? Delusion and epistemic reasons. In: Sullivan-Bissett, E. ed. Belief, Imagination, and Delusion. Mind Association Occasional Series Oxford University Press, pp. 227-239.
2022
- Archer, S. 2022. Salience and what matters. In: Archer, S. ed. Salience: A Philosophical Inquiry. Routledge, pp. 113-129.
2018
- Archer, S. 2018. Why 'believes' is not a vague predicate. Philosophical Studies 175, pp. 3029-3048. (10.1007/s11098-017-0993-3)
2017
- Archer, S. 2017. Defending exclusivity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94(2), pp. 326-341. (10.1111/phpr.12268)
Articles
- Archer, S. 2018. Why 'believes' is not a vague predicate. Philosophical Studies 175, pp. 3029-3048. (10.1007/s11098-017-0993-3)
- Archer, S. 2017. Defending exclusivity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94(2), pp. 326-341. (10.1111/phpr.12268)
Book sections
- Archer, S. 2024. Why do you believe that?. In: Sullivan-Bissett, E. ed. Belief, Imagination, and Delusion. Oxford University Press, pp. 227-239., (10.1093/oso/9780198872221.003.0011)
- Archer, S. 2024. Why do you believe that? Delusion and epistemic reasons. In: Sullivan-Bissett, E. ed. Belief, Imagination, and Delusion. Mind Association Occasional Series Oxford University Press, pp. 227-239.
- Archer, S. 2022. Salience and what matters. In: Archer, S. ed. Salience: A Philosophical Inquiry. Routledge, pp. 113-129.
Research
Forthcoming: 'Why do you believe that? Delusion and Epistemic Reasons' in Belief, Imagination, and Delusion, edited by Ema Sullivan-Bissett, OUP
2021: 'Salience and What Matters' in Salience: A Philosophical Inquiry, edited by Sophie Archer, Routledge
2021: Salience: A Philosophical Inquiry, edited by Sophie Archer, Routledge
2017: 'Why 'believes' is not a vague predicate' in Philosophical Studies
2015: 'Defending Exclusivity' in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
2013: 'Nondoxasticism about Self-Deception' in dialectica
2013: 'Review of 'The Self and Self-Knowledge' edited by Annalisa Coliva' in European Journal of Philosophy
Teaching
I have taught or co-taught the following modules at Cardiff.
Undergraduate
Critical Thinking, Debates in the History of Philosophy, Four Great Works in Philosophy, Epistemology, Belief and Irrationality, UG Dissertation
Postgraduate
Irrationality, Philosophy Research and Communication Skills, MA Dissertation
Biography
2018-Present: Lecturer in Philosophy, Cardiff University
2013-18: Stipendiary Lecturer in Philosophy, Christ Church, University of Oxford
2013-18: The Robin Geffen Research Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, Keble College, University of Oxford
2012-13: Postdoctoral Fellow, University of Southampton
2009-13: PhD Philosophy, University College London
2007-09: MPhil Stud Philosophy, University College London
2003-07: MA (Hons) Philosophy, University of Edinburgh
Supervisions
I am happy to supervise graduate students working in any of my research areas. I would be particularly interested to supervise projects on:
the nature of belief;
irrationality (both theoretical and practical).
Contact Details
+44 29208 74500
John Percival Building, Room 1.39, Colum Drive, Cardiff, CF10 3EU