![Nicholas Shackel](https://profiles-cardiff.imgix.net/attachments/1830?w=200&h=200&auto=format&crop=faces&fit=crop&q=90")
Professor Nicholas Shackel
Professor
- Available for postgraduate supervision
Overview
Central questions in philosophy are concerned with rationality and with paradoxes. I like to work in both these areas.
I have worked extensively on the nature of the obligation to be rational in action and belief. Moral, cultural, political and religious commitments give rise to a highly diverse variety of apparent obligations about what to do and believe. My work in this area is directed at analysing how rationality's authority relates to these obligations.
My work on paradoxes has taken me into working on their manifestations in formal theories of rationality, in epistemolgy and in metaphysics.
Publication
2025
- Jäger, C. and Shackel, N. 2025. Testimonial authority and knowledge transmission. Social Epistemology (10.1080/02691728.2025.2449608)
2024
- Shackel, N. 2024. Brentano's solution to Bertrand's paradox. Revue Roumaine De Philosophie 68(1), pp. 161-168.
- Shackel, N. 2024. Bertrand's paradox and the principle of indifference. New York: Routledge. (10.4324/9781003456308)
2022
- Shackel, N. 2022. Uncertainty phobia and epistemic forbearance in a pandemic. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 92, pp. 271-291. (10.1017/S1358246122000248)
- Shackel, N. 2022. The Nothing from infinity paradox versus plenitudinous indeterminism. European Journal for the Philosophy of Science 12, article number: 39. (10.1007/s13194-022-00463-z)
2021
- Shackel, N. 2021. Constructing a Moorean ‘open question’ argument: the real thought move and the real objective. Grazer Philosophische Studien - Internationale Zeitschrift für Analytische Philosophie 98, pp. 463-488. (10.1163/18756735-00000140)
2020
- Shackel, N. and Rowbottom, D. P. 2020. Bertrand's paradox and the maximum entropy principle. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101(3), pp. 505-523. (10.1111/phpr.12596)
2019
- Shackel, N., Farias, M. and Kahane, G. 2019. The scientific study of belief and pain modulation: conceptual problems. In: Spirituality, Religion and Health: From Research to Clinical Practice. Springer
2018
- Shackel, N. 2018. The infinity from nothing paradox and the immovable object meets the irresistible force. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8, pp. 417-433. (10.1007/s13194-017-0192-2)
- Shackel, N. 2018. Scope or focus? Normative focus and the metaphysics of normative relations. Journal of Philosophy 115(6), pp. 281-312. (10.5840/jphil2018115619)
- Shackel, N. 2018. A simple theory containing its own truth predicate. South American Journal of Logic 4(1), pp. 121-131.
2016
- Shackel, N. 2016. Freedom of speech. In: ten Have, H. ed. Encyclopedia of Global Bioethics. Berlin: Springer, pp. 1305-1309., (10.1007/978-3-319-09483-0_201)
- Shackel, N., Farias, M. and Kahane, G. 2016. Conceptual problems in the scientific study of belief. In: Jaeger, C. ed. Brain - Religion - Experience: Multidiscipline Encounters. Dordrecht and New York: Springer
2015
- Shackel, N. 2015. The normativity of rationality. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 34(2), pp. 167-189.
2014
- Shackel, N. 2014. A problem for the unity of normativity. Analysis 74(3), pp. 404-411. (10.1093/analys/anu063)
- Shackel, N. 2014. The nought belief paradox. Erkenntnis 79(3), pp. 523-529. (10.1007/s10670-013-9521-9)
- Shackel, N. 2014. Still waiting for a plausible Humean theory of reasons. Philosophical Studies 167(3), pp. 607-633. (10.1007/s11098-013-0117-7)
2013
- Shackel, N. 2013. Pseudoscience and idiosyncratic theories of rational belief. In: Pigliucci, M. and Boudry, M. eds. The Philosophy of Pseudoscience. Chicago: Chicago University Press, pp. 417-438.
- Shackel, N. 2013. The fragility of freedom of speech. Journal of Medical Ethics 39(5), pp. 316. (10.1136/medethics-2012-100628)
- Wiech, K., Kahane, G., Shackel, N., Farias, M., Savulescu, J. and Tracey, I. 2013. Cold or calculating? Reduced activity in the subgenual cingulate cortex reflects decreased emotional aversion to harming in counterintuitive utilitarian judgment. Cognition 126(3), pp. 364-372. (10.1016/j.cognition.2012.11.002)
2012
- Kahane, G., Wiech, K., Shackel, N., Farias, M., Savulescu, J. and Tracey, I. 2012. The neural basis of intuitive and counterintuitive moral judgment. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 7(4), pp. 393-402. (10.1093/scan/nsr005)
2011
- Shackel, N. 2011. The world as a graph: Defending graphical structuralism. Analysis 71(1), pp. 10-21. (10.1093/analys/anq118)
- Shackel, N. 2011. Explaining variation in knowledge by full belief. In: Proceedings of the 34th Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium, Austria, August 2011. Ontos Verlag: Wittgenstein Symposium, pp. 95-102.
2010
- Kahane, G. and Shackel, N. 2010. Methodological issues in the neuroscience of moral judgement. Mind and Language 25(5), pp. 561-582. (10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01401.x)
- Rowbottom, D. P. and Shackel, N. 2010. Bangu’s random thoughts on Bertrand’s Paradox. Analysis 70(4), pp. 689-692. (10.1093/analys/anq080)
- Shackel, N. 2010. Sophism and pragmatism. Logique et Analyse 53(210), pp. 131-149.
2008
- Shackel, N. 2008. Paradoxes of probability. In: Rudas, T. ed. Handbook of Probability : Theory and Applications. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, pp. 49-66.
- Shackel, N. 2008. Coherentism and the symmetry of epistemic support. Analysis 68(299), pp. 226-234. (10.1111/j.1467-8284.2008.00743.x)
- Kahane, G. and Shackel, N. 2008. Do abnormal responses show utilitarian bias?. Nature 452(7185), pp. E5-E5. (10.1038/nature06785)
- Wiech, K., Farias, M., Kahane, G., Shackel, N., Tiede, W. and Tracey, I. 2008. An fMRI study measuring analgesia enhanced by religion as a belief system. Pain 139(2), pp. 467-476.
2007
- Shackel, N. 2007. Parting smoothly?. Analysis 67(296), pp. 321-324. (10.1111/j.1467-8284.2007.00700.x)
- Shackel, N. 2007. Bertrand's Paradox and the principle of indifference. Philosophy of Science 74(2), pp. 150-175. (10.1086/519028)
2006
- Shackel, N. 2006. Shutting Dretske's door. Erkenntnis 64(3), pp. 393-401. (10.1007/s10670-006-9002-5)
- Clark, M. and Shackel, N. 2006. The Dr. Psycho paradox and Newcomb's problem. Erkenntnis 64(1), pp. 85-100. (10.1007/s10670-005-7515-y)
2005
- Shackel, N. 2005. The form of the Benardete Dichotomy. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56(2), pp. 397-417. (10.1093/bjps/axi121)
- Shackel, N. 2005. The vacuity of postmodernist methodology. Metaphilosophy 36(3), pp. 295-320. (10.1111/j.1467-9973.2005.00370.x)
2003
- Shackel, N. 2003. D Gillies, Philosophical theories of probability [Book Review]. Philosophical Books 44(1), pp. 92-95. (10.1111/1468-0149.00290)
- Clark, M. and Shackel, N. 2003. Decision theory, symmetry and causal structure: Reply to Meacham and Weisberg. Mind 112(448), pp. 691-701. (10.1093/mind/112.448.691)
2000
- Clark, M. and Shackel, N. 2000. The two-envelope paradox. Mind 109(435), pp. 415-442. (10.1093/mind/109.435.415)
Articles
- Jäger, C. and Shackel, N. 2025. Testimonial authority and knowledge transmission. Social Epistemology (10.1080/02691728.2025.2449608)
- Shackel, N. 2024. Brentano's solution to Bertrand's paradox. Revue Roumaine De Philosophie 68(1), pp. 161-168.
- Shackel, N. 2022. Uncertainty phobia and epistemic forbearance in a pandemic. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 92, pp. 271-291. (10.1017/S1358246122000248)
- Shackel, N. 2022. The Nothing from infinity paradox versus plenitudinous indeterminism. European Journal for the Philosophy of Science 12, article number: 39. (10.1007/s13194-022-00463-z)
- Shackel, N. 2021. Constructing a Moorean ‘open question’ argument: the real thought move and the real objective. Grazer Philosophische Studien - Internationale Zeitschrift für Analytische Philosophie 98, pp. 463-488. (10.1163/18756735-00000140)
- Shackel, N. and Rowbottom, D. P. 2020. Bertrand's paradox and the maximum entropy principle. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101(3), pp. 505-523. (10.1111/phpr.12596)
- Shackel, N. 2018. The infinity from nothing paradox and the immovable object meets the irresistible force. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8, pp. 417-433. (10.1007/s13194-017-0192-2)
- Shackel, N. 2018. Scope or focus? Normative focus and the metaphysics of normative relations. Journal of Philosophy 115(6), pp. 281-312. (10.5840/jphil2018115619)
- Shackel, N. 2018. A simple theory containing its own truth predicate. South American Journal of Logic 4(1), pp. 121-131.
- Shackel, N. 2015. The normativity of rationality. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 34(2), pp. 167-189.
- Shackel, N. 2014. A problem for the unity of normativity. Analysis 74(3), pp. 404-411. (10.1093/analys/anu063)
- Shackel, N. 2014. The nought belief paradox. Erkenntnis 79(3), pp. 523-529. (10.1007/s10670-013-9521-9)
- Shackel, N. 2014. Still waiting for a plausible Humean theory of reasons. Philosophical Studies 167(3), pp. 607-633. (10.1007/s11098-013-0117-7)
- Shackel, N. 2013. The fragility of freedom of speech. Journal of Medical Ethics 39(5), pp. 316. (10.1136/medethics-2012-100628)
- Wiech, K., Kahane, G., Shackel, N., Farias, M., Savulescu, J. and Tracey, I. 2013. Cold or calculating? Reduced activity in the subgenual cingulate cortex reflects decreased emotional aversion to harming in counterintuitive utilitarian judgment. Cognition 126(3), pp. 364-372. (10.1016/j.cognition.2012.11.002)
- Kahane, G., Wiech, K., Shackel, N., Farias, M., Savulescu, J. and Tracey, I. 2012. The neural basis of intuitive and counterintuitive moral judgment. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience 7(4), pp. 393-402. (10.1093/scan/nsr005)
- Shackel, N. 2011. The world as a graph: Defending graphical structuralism. Analysis 71(1), pp. 10-21. (10.1093/analys/anq118)
- Kahane, G. and Shackel, N. 2010. Methodological issues in the neuroscience of moral judgement. Mind and Language 25(5), pp. 561-582. (10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01401.x)
- Rowbottom, D. P. and Shackel, N. 2010. Bangu’s random thoughts on Bertrand’s Paradox. Analysis 70(4), pp. 689-692. (10.1093/analys/anq080)
- Shackel, N. 2010. Sophism and pragmatism. Logique et Analyse 53(210), pp. 131-149.
- Shackel, N. 2008. Coherentism and the symmetry of epistemic support. Analysis 68(299), pp. 226-234. (10.1111/j.1467-8284.2008.00743.x)
- Kahane, G. and Shackel, N. 2008. Do abnormal responses show utilitarian bias?. Nature 452(7185), pp. E5-E5. (10.1038/nature06785)
- Wiech, K., Farias, M., Kahane, G., Shackel, N., Tiede, W. and Tracey, I. 2008. An fMRI study measuring analgesia enhanced by religion as a belief system. Pain 139(2), pp. 467-476.
- Shackel, N. 2007. Parting smoothly?. Analysis 67(296), pp. 321-324. (10.1111/j.1467-8284.2007.00700.x)
- Shackel, N. 2007. Bertrand's Paradox and the principle of indifference. Philosophy of Science 74(2), pp. 150-175. (10.1086/519028)
- Shackel, N. 2006. Shutting Dretske's door. Erkenntnis 64(3), pp. 393-401. (10.1007/s10670-006-9002-5)
- Clark, M. and Shackel, N. 2006. The Dr. Psycho paradox and Newcomb's problem. Erkenntnis 64(1), pp. 85-100. (10.1007/s10670-005-7515-y)
- Shackel, N. 2005. The form of the Benardete Dichotomy. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56(2), pp. 397-417. (10.1093/bjps/axi121)
- Shackel, N. 2005. The vacuity of postmodernist methodology. Metaphilosophy 36(3), pp. 295-320. (10.1111/j.1467-9973.2005.00370.x)
- Shackel, N. 2003. D Gillies, Philosophical theories of probability [Book Review]. Philosophical Books 44(1), pp. 92-95. (10.1111/1468-0149.00290)
- Clark, M. and Shackel, N. 2003. Decision theory, symmetry and causal structure: Reply to Meacham and Weisberg. Mind 112(448), pp. 691-701. (10.1093/mind/112.448.691)
- Clark, M. and Shackel, N. 2000. The two-envelope paradox. Mind 109(435), pp. 415-442. (10.1093/mind/109.435.415)
Book sections
- Shackel, N., Farias, M. and Kahane, G. 2019. The scientific study of belief and pain modulation: conceptual problems. In: Spirituality, Religion and Health: From Research to Clinical Practice. Springer
- Shackel, N. 2016. Freedom of speech. In: ten Have, H. ed. Encyclopedia of Global Bioethics. Berlin: Springer, pp. 1305-1309., (10.1007/978-3-319-09483-0_201)
- Shackel, N., Farias, M. and Kahane, G. 2016. Conceptual problems in the scientific study of belief. In: Jaeger, C. ed. Brain - Religion - Experience: Multidiscipline Encounters. Dordrecht and New York: Springer
- Shackel, N. 2013. Pseudoscience and idiosyncratic theories of rational belief. In: Pigliucci, M. and Boudry, M. eds. The Philosophy of Pseudoscience. Chicago: Chicago University Press, pp. 417-438.
- Shackel, N. 2011. Explaining variation in knowledge by full belief. In: Proceedings of the 34th Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium, Austria, August 2011. Ontos Verlag: Wittgenstein Symposium, pp. 95-102.
- Shackel, N. 2008. Paradoxes of probability. In: Rudas, T. ed. Handbook of Probability : Theory and Applications. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, pp. 49-66.
Books
- Shackel, N. 2024. Bertrand's paradox and the principle of indifference. New York: Routledge. (10.4324/9781003456308)
Research
Research interests
Rationality and the relation of rationality and normativity. My work here includes practical reason and also the relation of rational belief and the ethics of belief.
The application of formal methods to philosophical questions. My work here includes papers on metaphysics, epistemology and paradox.
Biography
I did my doctorate at the University of Nottingham, giving a Humean answer to the question of why we ought to be rational. I have lectured at the Universities of Nottingham, Warwick and Aberdeen and immediately prior to taking up my position at Cardiff was a research fellow in the faculty of philosophy at Oxford.
Supervisions
I am interested in supervising research in the following areas:
Rationality and the normativity of rationality.
Formal theories of rationality and epistemology.
Formal methods and problems in metaphysics.
Paradoxes.
