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Dr Jonathan Mitchell
Uwch Ddarlithydd
Ysgol Saesneg, Cyfathrebu ac Athroniaeth
- Ar gael fel goruchwyliwr ôl-raddedig
Trosolwyg
Ar hyn o bryd rwy'n Uwch-ddarlithydd mewn Athroniaeth.
Rwy'n gweithio yn athroniaeth y meddwl, gyda ffocws ar ffenomenoleg, canfyddiad, emosiwn, a gwerth.
Yn ddiweddar, cyhoeddais lyfr o'r enw "Emotions as Feelings Towards Value: A Theory of Emotional Experience" gyda Oxford University Press.
Am restr lawn o gyhoeddiadau ac ymchwil, gweler http://www.jonathanmitchell.co.uk/
Cyhoeddiad
2024
- Mitchell, J. 2024. Sartre’s exclusion claim: Perception and imagination as radically distinct consciousnesses. European Journal of Philosophy (10.1111/ejop.13017)
- Mitchell, J. 2024. The horizonal structure of visual experience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102(2), pp. 428-448. (10.1080/00048402.2023.2289114)
- Mitchell, J. 2024. Towards affective-evaluativism: the intentional structure of unpleasant pain experience. Philosophical Quarterly (10.1093/pq/pqae002)
- Mitchell, J. 2024. A Nietzschean theory of emotional experience: Affect as feeling towards value. Inquiry 67(1), pp. 1-24. (10.1080/0020174X.2020.1850341)
2023
- Mitchell, J. 2023. On the temporality of the emotions: An essay on grief, anger, and love, by Berislav Marušić [Book Review]. European Journal of Philosophy 31(2), pp. 534-538. (10.1111/ejop.12858)
- Mitchell, J. 2023. Emotion and attention. Philosophical Studies 180, pp. 79-99. (10.1007/s11098-022-01876-5)
- Mitchell, J. 2023. Exploring affective evaluative horizons. Journal of Consciousness Studies 30(7-8), pp. 36-60. (10.53765/20512201.30.7.036)
2022
- Mitchell, J. 2022. The phenomenal contribution of attention. Inquiry (10.1080/0020174X.2022.2107061)
- Mitchell, J. 2022. Liking that it hurts: the case of the masochist and second-order desire accounts of pain’s unpleasantness. American Philosophical Quarterly 59(2), pp. 181-189. (10.5406/21521123.59.2.06)
2021
- Mitchell, J. 2021. Affective shifts: mood, emotion and well-being. Synthese 199, pp. 11793-11820. (10.1007/s11229-021-03312-3)
- Mitchell, J. 2021. Experiencing mandates: Towards a hybrid account. Australasian Journal of Philosophy (10.1080/00048402.2021.1995013)
- Mitchell, J. 2021. The bodily-attitudinal theory of emotion. Philosophical Studies 178, pp. 2635-2663. (10.1007/s11098-020-01567-z)
- Mitchell, J. 2021. The mind’s presence to itself: In search of non‐intentional awareness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (10.1111/phpr.12804)
- Mitchell, J. 2021. Affective representation and affective attitudes. Synthese 198, pp. 3519-3546. (10.1007/s11229-019-02294-7)
- Mitchell, J. 2021. Self-locating content in visual experience and the "here-replacement" account. Journal of Philosophy 118(4), pp. 188-213. (10.5840/jphil2021118414)
- Mitchell, J. 2021. Two irreducible classes of emotional experiences: Affective imaginings and affective perceptions. European Journal of Philosophy (10.1111/ejop.12648)
- Mitchell, J. 2021. Emotion as feeling towards value: a theory of emotional experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2020
- Mitchell, J. 2020. The irreducibility of emotional phenomenology. Erkenntnis 85, pp. 1241-1268. (10.1007/s10670-018-0075-8)
- Mitchell, J. 2020. Another look at mode intentionalism. Erkenntnis (10.1007/s10670-020-00314-4)
- Mitchell, J. 2020. The attitudinal opacity of emotional experience. Philosophical Quarterly 70(280), pp. 524-546. (10.1093/pq/pqz085)
- Mitchell, J. 2020. On the non-conceptual content of affective-evaluative experience. Synthese 197(7), pp. 3087-3111. (10.1007/s11229-018-1872-y)
- Mitchell, J. 2020. Understanding meta-emotions: Prospects for a perceptualist account. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50(4), pp. 505-523. (10.1017/can.2019.47)
2019
- Mitchell, J. 2019. Emotional experience and propositional content. Dialectica 73(4), pp. 535-561. (10.1111/1746-8361.12285)
- Mitchell, J. 2019. Pre-emotional value awareness and the content-priority view. Philosophical Quarterly 69(277), pp. 771-794. (10.1093/pq/pqz018)
- Mitchell, J. 2019. The varieties of mood intentionality. In: Breidenbach, B. and Docherty, T. eds. Mood: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New Theories. New York, NY: Routledge
- Mitchell, J. 2019. The intentionality and intelligibility of moods. European Journal of Philosophy 27(1), pp. 118-135. (10.1111/ejop.12385)
- Mitchell, J. 2019. Can Evaluativism about unpleasant pains meet the normative condition?. Inquiry 62(7), pp. 779-802. (10.1080/0020174X.2018.1562377)
2017
- Mitchell, J. 2017. A Nietzschean critique of metaphysical philosophy. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 48(3), pp. 347-374. (10.5325/jnietstud.48.3.0347)
- Mitchell, J. 2017. The epistemology of emotional experience. Dialectica 71(1), pp. 84. (10.1111/1746-8361.12171)
- Mitchell, J. 2017. Nietzsche on taste: Epistemic privilege and anti-realism. Inquiry 60(1-2), pp. 31-65. (10.1080/0020174X.2016.1251166)
2016
- Mitchell, J. 2016. Nietzschean self-overcoming. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 47(3), pp. 323-350. (10.5325/jnietstud.47.3.0323)
Articles
- Mitchell, J. 2024. Sartre’s exclusion claim: Perception and imagination as radically distinct consciousnesses. European Journal of Philosophy (10.1111/ejop.13017)
- Mitchell, J. 2024. The horizonal structure of visual experience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102(2), pp. 428-448. (10.1080/00048402.2023.2289114)
- Mitchell, J. 2024. Towards affective-evaluativism: the intentional structure of unpleasant pain experience. Philosophical Quarterly (10.1093/pq/pqae002)
- Mitchell, J. 2024. A Nietzschean theory of emotional experience: Affect as feeling towards value. Inquiry 67(1), pp. 1-24. (10.1080/0020174X.2020.1850341)
- Mitchell, J. 2023. On the temporality of the emotions: An essay on grief, anger, and love, by Berislav Marušić [Book Review]. European Journal of Philosophy 31(2), pp. 534-538. (10.1111/ejop.12858)
- Mitchell, J. 2023. Emotion and attention. Philosophical Studies 180, pp. 79-99. (10.1007/s11098-022-01876-5)
- Mitchell, J. 2023. Exploring affective evaluative horizons. Journal of Consciousness Studies 30(7-8), pp. 36-60. (10.53765/20512201.30.7.036)
- Mitchell, J. 2022. The phenomenal contribution of attention. Inquiry (10.1080/0020174X.2022.2107061)
- Mitchell, J. 2022. Liking that it hurts: the case of the masochist and second-order desire accounts of pain’s unpleasantness. American Philosophical Quarterly 59(2), pp. 181-189. (10.5406/21521123.59.2.06)
- Mitchell, J. 2021. Affective shifts: mood, emotion and well-being. Synthese 199, pp. 11793-11820. (10.1007/s11229-021-03312-3)
- Mitchell, J. 2021. Experiencing mandates: Towards a hybrid account. Australasian Journal of Philosophy (10.1080/00048402.2021.1995013)
- Mitchell, J. 2021. The bodily-attitudinal theory of emotion. Philosophical Studies 178, pp. 2635-2663. (10.1007/s11098-020-01567-z)
- Mitchell, J. 2021. The mind’s presence to itself: In search of non‐intentional awareness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (10.1111/phpr.12804)
- Mitchell, J. 2021. Affective representation and affective attitudes. Synthese 198, pp. 3519-3546. (10.1007/s11229-019-02294-7)
- Mitchell, J. 2021. Self-locating content in visual experience and the "here-replacement" account. Journal of Philosophy 118(4), pp. 188-213. (10.5840/jphil2021118414)
- Mitchell, J. 2021. Two irreducible classes of emotional experiences: Affective imaginings and affective perceptions. European Journal of Philosophy (10.1111/ejop.12648)
- Mitchell, J. 2020. The irreducibility of emotional phenomenology. Erkenntnis 85, pp. 1241-1268. (10.1007/s10670-018-0075-8)
- Mitchell, J. 2020. Another look at mode intentionalism. Erkenntnis (10.1007/s10670-020-00314-4)
- Mitchell, J. 2020. The attitudinal opacity of emotional experience. Philosophical Quarterly 70(280), pp. 524-546. (10.1093/pq/pqz085)
- Mitchell, J. 2020. On the non-conceptual content of affective-evaluative experience. Synthese 197(7), pp. 3087-3111. (10.1007/s11229-018-1872-y)
- Mitchell, J. 2020. Understanding meta-emotions: Prospects for a perceptualist account. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50(4), pp. 505-523. (10.1017/can.2019.47)
- Mitchell, J. 2019. Emotional experience and propositional content. Dialectica 73(4), pp. 535-561. (10.1111/1746-8361.12285)
- Mitchell, J. 2019. Pre-emotional value awareness and the content-priority view. Philosophical Quarterly 69(277), pp. 771-794. (10.1093/pq/pqz018)
- Mitchell, J. 2019. The intentionality and intelligibility of moods. European Journal of Philosophy 27(1), pp. 118-135. (10.1111/ejop.12385)
- Mitchell, J. 2019. Can Evaluativism about unpleasant pains meet the normative condition?. Inquiry 62(7), pp. 779-802. (10.1080/0020174X.2018.1562377)
- Mitchell, J. 2017. A Nietzschean critique of metaphysical philosophy. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 48(3), pp. 347-374. (10.5325/jnietstud.48.3.0347)
- Mitchell, J. 2017. The epistemology of emotional experience. Dialectica 71(1), pp. 84. (10.1111/1746-8361.12171)
- Mitchell, J. 2017. Nietzsche on taste: Epistemic privilege and anti-realism. Inquiry 60(1-2), pp. 31-65. (10.1080/0020174X.2016.1251166)
- Mitchell, J. 2016. Nietzschean self-overcoming. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 47(3), pp. 323-350. (10.5325/jnietstud.47.3.0323)
Book sections
- Mitchell, J. 2019. The varieties of mood intentionality. In: Breidenbach, B. and Docherty, T. eds. Mood: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New Theories. New York, NY: Routledge
Books
- Mitchell, J. 2021. Emotion as feeling towards value: a theory of emotional experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ymchwil
Mae fy ymchwil yn canolbwyntio ar y groesffordd rhwng athroniaeth meddwl a ffenomenoleg.
Rwyf bellach yn gweithio tuag at theori gorwelion bwriadol, gan dynnu ar ddeunydd gan Husserl, Sartre, ac athronwyr cyfoes. Ystyriwch y nodweddion syfrdanol canlynol o brofiad bob dydd. Yn sefyll o flaen tŷ, dim ond ei ochr blaen y gwelwn ni. Serch hynny, mae ein profiad gweledol o endid tri dimensiwn. Rydyn ni'n gweld tŷ, nid ffasâd yn unig. Fel arall, dywedwch fy mod i'n gwrando ar ddarn o gerddoriaeth. Y cyfan rwy'n ei glywed yn llym ar unrhyw un foment yw'r nodiadau sy'n cael eu swnio ar hyn o bryd, ond serch hynny, rwy'n clywed alaw yn datblygu, yn hytrach na chyfres o gordiau datgysylltiedig. Nesaf, ystyriwch sut mae'n ymddangos bod ystod o'n hemosiynau a'n dyheadau yn peri pryder i'w hunain am 'werthoedd yn y dyfodol' – dywedwch lawenydd disgwyliedig aduniad gyda ffrind – nad yw'r sylweddoliad yn aml yn dod yn brin o ddisgwyliadau (rydym yn profi 'anfodlonrwydd o ran presenoldeb'). Yn yr holl achosion hyn, er eu bod mewn ffyrdd pwysig, mae'n ymddangos bod y nodweddion dyrys yn deillio o'r ffordd y mae profiadau o'r fath yn cynnwys 'ymdeimlad o'r posibl' sy'n mynd y tu hwnt i'r hyn a gynrychiolir yn benodol. Nod fy ymchwil cyfredol yw egluro'r ffordd y mae'r ymdeimlad hwn o'r ffigurau posibl ar draws ystod o brofiadau, o'r mathau o achosion canfyddiadol a grybwyllir uchod i brofiad affeithiol a gwerthusol. Gan gysylltu trafodaethau ar themâu tebyg yn hanes athroniaeth ag athroniaeth gyfoes y meddwl, bydd yr ymchwil hon yn darparu ymchwiliad cynhwysfawr i'r pwnc hynod ddiddorol ond yn aml yn cael ei anwybyddu.
Rwy'n parhau i fod â diddordeb bywiog mewn datblygiadau diweddar yn athroniaeth emosiwn, ac yn ehangach mewn meysydd athroniaeth meddwl sy'n poeni eu hunain am ddeall natur bwriadoldeb ymwybodol.
Addysgu
I am an associate fellow of the Higher Education Academy.
UG courses taught or co-taught: A Sense of the Possible, The Varieties of Experience, Critical Thinking
PG courses taught: Varieties of Philosophical Reasoning
Bywgraffiad
Astudiais ar gyfer fy ngradd Meistr mewn Athroniaeth ym Mhrifysgol Sheffield a chefais fy PhD o Brifysgol Warwick yn 2016. Rhwng 2017-8, roeddwn i'n ôl-ddoethurol ym Mhrifysgol Johannesburg (Adran Athroniaeth). Rhwng 2018-2021 roeddwn yn gymrawd ymchwil ôl-ddoethurol yr Academi Brydeinig ym Mhrifysgol Manceinion (ar y prosiect 'Emotions as Feeling Towards Value'). Ymunais â'r Adran Athroniaeth ym Mhrifysgol Caerdydd fel darlithydd ym mis Medi 2021
Meysydd goruchwyliaeth
Mae gen i ddiddordeb mewn goruchwylio myfyrwyr PhD yn y meysydd canlynol:
- Ffenomenoleg
- Emosiwn a Gwerth
- Bwriadoldeb
- Ymwybyddiaeth (yn benodol pynciau sy'n ymwneud â phrofiad ymwybodol)
- Husserl, Sartre, a ffenomenolegwyr clasurol eraill
- Nietzsche
Goruchwyliaeth gyfredol
Beatrice Pagliarone
Myfyriwr ymchwil