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Dr Jonathan Mitchell
- Ar gael fel goruchwyliwr ôl-raddedig
Timau a rolau for Jonathan Mitchell
Uwch Ddarlithydd
Ysgol y Dyniaethau Byd-eang
Trosolwg
Ar hyn o bryd rwy'n Uwch Ddarlithydd mewn Athroniaeth, ac yn Bennaeth yr Adran Athroniaeth a Chrefydd
Rwy'n gweithio yn athroniaeth meddwl, gyda ffocws ar ganfyddiad gofodol, Ffenomenoleg Glasurol, emosiwn a gwerth.
Cyhoeddais fy ail lyfr yn 2026, o'r enw 'A Sense of the Possible: The Horizons of Visual Experience', gyda Gwasg Prifysgol Rhydychen - Amazon Link
Cyhoeddwyd fy llyfr cyntaf yn 2021, o'r enw "Emotions as Feelings Towards Value: A Theory of Emotional Experience" gyda Gwasg Prifysgol Rhydychen.
Am restr lawn o gyhoeddiadau ac ymchwil gweler http://www.jonathanmitchell.co.uk/
Cyhoeddiad
2026
- Mitchell, J. 2026. Phenomenological disjunctivism. Ergo 13 , pp.1178-1204. 41. (10.3998/ergo.10999)
- Mitchell, J. 2026. Episodic recollection and past perception. Philosophical Psychology (10.1080/09515089.2026.2702597)
- Mitchell, J. 2026. A sense of the possible: the horizons of visual experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (10.1093/9780198998990.001.0001)
- Mitchell, J. 2026. The sensory dimension of episodic recollection. Erkenntnis (10.1007/s10670-026-01071-6)
- Mitchell, J. 2026. Peripersonal space as the haptic field. Synthese 207 65. (10.1007/s11229-025-05430-8)
2025
- Mitchell, J. 2025. Sartre’s exclusion claim: Perception and imagination as radically distinct consciousnesses. European Journal of Philosophy 33 (2), pp.682-699. (10.1111/ejop.13017)
- Mitchell, J. 2025. Towards affective-evaluativism: the intentional structure of unpleasant pain experience. Philosophical Quarterly 75 , pp.693-717. (10.1093/pq/pqae002)
- Mitchell, J. 2025. The phenomenal contribution of attention. Inquiry 68 , pp.513-544. (10.1080/0020174X.2022.2107061)
2024
- Mitchell, J. 2024. The horizonal structure of visual experience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (2), pp.428-448. (10.1080/00048402.2023.2289114)
- Mitchell, J. 2024. A Nietzschean theory of emotional experience: Affect as feeling towards value. Inquiry 67 (1), pp.1-24. (10.1080/0020174X.2020.1850341)
2023
- Mitchell, J. 2023. On the temporality of the emotions: An essay on grief, anger, and love, by Berislav Marušić [Book Review]. European Journal of Philosophy 31 (2), pp.534-538. (10.1111/ejop.12858)
- Mitchell, J. 2023. Emotion and attention. Philosophical Studies 180 , pp.79-99. (10.1007/s11098-022-01876-5)
- Mitchell, J. 2023. Exploring affective evaluative horizons. Journal of Consciousness Studies 30 (7-8), pp.36-60. (10.53765/20512201.30.7.036)
2022
- Mitchell, J. 2022. Liking that it hurts: the case of the masochist and second-order desire accounts of pain’s unpleasantness. American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2), pp.181-189. (10.5406/21521123.59.2.06)
2021
- Mitchell, J. 2021. Affective shifts: mood, emotion and well-being. Synthese 199 , pp.11793-11820. (10.1007/s11229-021-03312-3)
- Mitchell, J. 2021. Experiencing mandates: Towards a hybrid account. Australasian Journal of Philosophy (10.1080/00048402.2021.1995013)
- Mitchell, J. 2021. The bodily-attitudinal theory of emotion. Philosophical Studies 178 , pp.2635-2663. (10.1007/s11098-020-01567-z)
- Mitchell, J. 2021. The mind’s presence to itself: In search of non‐intentional awareness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (10.1111/phpr.12804)
- Mitchell, J. 2021. Affective representation and affective attitudes. Synthese 198 , pp.3519-3546. (10.1007/s11229-019-02294-7)
- Mitchell, J. 2021. Self-locating content in visual experience and the "here-replacement" account. Journal of Philosophy 118 (4), pp.188-213. (10.5840/jphil2021118414)
- Mitchell, J. 2021. Two irreducible classes of emotional experiences: Affective imaginings and affective perceptions. European Journal of Philosophy (10.1111/ejop.12648)
- Mitchell, J. 2021. Emotion as feeling towards value: a theory of emotional experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
2020
- Mitchell, J. 2020. The irreducibility of emotional phenomenology. Erkenntnis 85 , pp.1241-1268. (10.1007/s10670-018-0075-8)
- Mitchell, J. 2020. Another look at mode intentionalism. Erkenntnis (10.1007/s10670-020-00314-4)
- Mitchell, J. 2020. On the non-conceptual content of affective-evaluative experience. Synthese 197 (7), pp.3087-3111. (10.1007/s11229-018-1872-y)
- Mitchell, J. 2020. The attitudinal opacity of emotional experience. Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280), pp.524-546. (10.1093/pq/pqz085)
- Mitchell, J. 2020. Understanding meta-emotions: Prospects for a perceptualist account. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (4), pp.505-523. (10.1017/can.2019.47)
2019
- Mitchell, J. 2019. Emotional experience and propositional content. Dialectica 73 (4), pp.535-561. (10.1111/1746-8361.12285)
- Mitchell, J. 2019. Pre-emotional value awareness and the content-priority view. Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277), pp.771-794. (10.1093/pq/pqz018)
- Mitchell, J. 2019. The varieties of mood intentionality. In: Breidenbach, B. and Docherty, T. eds. Mood: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New Theories. New York, NY: Routledge
- Mitchell, J. 2019. The intentionality and intelligibility of moods. European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1), pp.118-135. (10.1111/ejop.12385)
- Mitchell, J. 2019. Can Evaluativism about unpleasant pains meet the normative condition?. Inquiry 62 (7), pp.779-802. (10.1080/0020174X.2018.1562377)
2017
- Mitchell, J. 2017. A Nietzschean critique of metaphysical philosophy. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 48 (3), pp.347-374. (10.5325/jnietstud.48.3.0347)
- Mitchell, J. 2017. The epistemology of emotional experience. Dialectica 71 (1), pp.84. (10.1111/1746-8361.12171)
- Mitchell, J. 2017. Nietzsche on taste: Epistemic privilege and anti-realism. Inquiry 60 (1-2), pp.31-65. (10.1080/0020174X.2016.1251166)
2016
- Mitchell, J. 2016. Nietzschean self-overcoming. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 47 (3), pp.323-350. (10.5325/jnietstud.47.3.0323)
Adrannau llyfrau
- Mitchell, J. 2019. The varieties of mood intentionality. In: Breidenbach, B. and Docherty, T. eds. Mood: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New Theories. New York, NY: Routledge
Erthyglau
- Mitchell, J. 2026. Phenomenological disjunctivism. Ergo 13 , pp.1178-1204. 41. (10.3998/ergo.10999)
- Mitchell, J. 2026. Episodic recollection and past perception. Philosophical Psychology (10.1080/09515089.2026.2702597)
- Mitchell, J. 2026. The sensory dimension of episodic recollection. Erkenntnis (10.1007/s10670-026-01071-6)
- Mitchell, J. 2026. Peripersonal space as the haptic field. Synthese 207 65. (10.1007/s11229-025-05430-8)
- Mitchell, J. 2025. Sartre’s exclusion claim: Perception and imagination as radically distinct consciousnesses. European Journal of Philosophy 33 (2), pp.682-699. (10.1111/ejop.13017)
- Mitchell, J. 2025. Towards affective-evaluativism: the intentional structure of unpleasant pain experience. Philosophical Quarterly 75 , pp.693-717. (10.1093/pq/pqae002)
- Mitchell, J. 2025. The phenomenal contribution of attention. Inquiry 68 , pp.513-544. (10.1080/0020174X.2022.2107061)
- Mitchell, J. 2024. The horizonal structure of visual experience. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (2), pp.428-448. (10.1080/00048402.2023.2289114)
- Mitchell, J. 2024. A Nietzschean theory of emotional experience: Affect as feeling towards value. Inquiry 67 (1), pp.1-24. (10.1080/0020174X.2020.1850341)
- Mitchell, J. 2023. On the temporality of the emotions: An essay on grief, anger, and love, by Berislav Marušić [Book Review]. European Journal of Philosophy 31 (2), pp.534-538. (10.1111/ejop.12858)
- Mitchell, J. 2023. Emotion and attention. Philosophical Studies 180 , pp.79-99. (10.1007/s11098-022-01876-5)
- Mitchell, J. 2023. Exploring affective evaluative horizons. Journal of Consciousness Studies 30 (7-8), pp.36-60. (10.53765/20512201.30.7.036)
- Mitchell, J. 2022. Liking that it hurts: the case of the masochist and second-order desire accounts of pain’s unpleasantness. American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2), pp.181-189. (10.5406/21521123.59.2.06)
- Mitchell, J. 2021. Affective shifts: mood, emotion and well-being. Synthese 199 , pp.11793-11820. (10.1007/s11229-021-03312-3)
- Mitchell, J. 2021. Experiencing mandates: Towards a hybrid account. Australasian Journal of Philosophy (10.1080/00048402.2021.1995013)
- Mitchell, J. 2021. The bodily-attitudinal theory of emotion. Philosophical Studies 178 , pp.2635-2663. (10.1007/s11098-020-01567-z)
- Mitchell, J. 2021. The mind’s presence to itself: In search of non‐intentional awareness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (10.1111/phpr.12804)
- Mitchell, J. 2021. Affective representation and affective attitudes. Synthese 198 , pp.3519-3546. (10.1007/s11229-019-02294-7)
- Mitchell, J. 2021. Self-locating content in visual experience and the "here-replacement" account. Journal of Philosophy 118 (4), pp.188-213. (10.5840/jphil2021118414)
- Mitchell, J. 2021. Two irreducible classes of emotional experiences: Affective imaginings and affective perceptions. European Journal of Philosophy (10.1111/ejop.12648)
- Mitchell, J. 2020. The irreducibility of emotional phenomenology. Erkenntnis 85 , pp.1241-1268. (10.1007/s10670-018-0075-8)
- Mitchell, J. 2020. Another look at mode intentionalism. Erkenntnis (10.1007/s10670-020-00314-4)
- Mitchell, J. 2020. On the non-conceptual content of affective-evaluative experience. Synthese 197 (7), pp.3087-3111. (10.1007/s11229-018-1872-y)
- Mitchell, J. 2020. The attitudinal opacity of emotional experience. Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280), pp.524-546. (10.1093/pq/pqz085)
- Mitchell, J. 2020. Understanding meta-emotions: Prospects for a perceptualist account. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (4), pp.505-523. (10.1017/can.2019.47)
- Mitchell, J. 2019. Emotional experience and propositional content. Dialectica 73 (4), pp.535-561. (10.1111/1746-8361.12285)
- Mitchell, J. 2019. Pre-emotional value awareness and the content-priority view. Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277), pp.771-794. (10.1093/pq/pqz018)
- Mitchell, J. 2019. The intentionality and intelligibility of moods. European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1), pp.118-135. (10.1111/ejop.12385)
- Mitchell, J. 2019. Can Evaluativism about unpleasant pains meet the normative condition?. Inquiry 62 (7), pp.779-802. (10.1080/0020174X.2018.1562377)
- Mitchell, J. 2017. A Nietzschean critique of metaphysical philosophy. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 48 (3), pp.347-374. (10.5325/jnietstud.48.3.0347)
- Mitchell, J. 2017. The epistemology of emotional experience. Dialectica 71 (1), pp.84. (10.1111/1746-8361.12171)
- Mitchell, J. 2017. Nietzsche on taste: Epistemic privilege and anti-realism. Inquiry 60 (1-2), pp.31-65. (10.1080/0020174X.2016.1251166)
- Mitchell, J. 2016. Nietzschean self-overcoming. Journal of Nietzsche Studies 47 (3), pp.323-350. (10.5325/jnietstud.47.3.0323)
Llyfrau
- Mitchell, J. 2026. A sense of the possible: the horizons of visual experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (10.1093/9780198998990.001.0001)
- Mitchell, J. 2021. Emotion as feeling towards value: a theory of emotional experience. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ymchwil
Mae fy ymchwil yn canolbwyntio ar y groesffordd rhwng athroniaeth meddwl a ffenomenoleg.
Rwyf bellach yn gweithio tuag at theori gorwelion bwriadol, gan dynnu ar ddeunydd gan Husserl, Sartre, ac athronwyr cyfoes. Ystyriwch y nodweddion syfrdanol canlynol o brofiad bob dydd. Yn sefyll o flaen tŷ, dim ond ei ochr blaen y gwelwn ni. Serch hynny, mae ein profiad gweledol o endid tri dimensiwn. Rydyn ni'n gweld tŷ, nid ffasâd yn unig. Fel arall, dywedwch fy mod i'n gwrando ar ddarn o gerddoriaeth. Y cyfan rwy'n ei glywed yn llym ar unrhyw un foment yw'r nodiadau sy'n cael eu swnio ar hyn o bryd, ond serch hynny, rwy'n clywed alaw yn datblygu, yn hytrach na chyfres o gordiau datgysylltiedig. Nesaf, ystyriwch sut mae'n ymddangos bod ystod o'n hemosiynau a'n dyheadau yn peri pryder i'w hunain am 'werthoedd yn y dyfodol' – dywedwch lawenydd disgwyliedig aduniad gyda ffrind – nad yw'r sylweddoliad yn aml yn dod yn brin o ddisgwyliadau (rydym yn profi 'anfodlonrwydd o ran presenoldeb'). Yn yr holl achosion hyn, er eu bod mewn ffyrdd pwysig, mae'n ymddangos bod y nodweddion dyrys yn deillio o'r ffordd y mae profiadau o'r fath yn cynnwys 'ymdeimlad o'r posibl' sy'n mynd y tu hwnt i'r hyn a gynrychiolir yn benodol. Nod fy ymchwil cyfredol yw egluro'r ffordd y mae'r ymdeimlad hwn o'r ffigurau posibl ar draws ystod o brofiadau, o'r mathau o achosion canfyddiadol a grybwyllir uchod i brofiad affeithiol a gwerthusol. Gan gysylltu trafodaethau ar themâu tebyg yn hanes athroniaeth ag athroniaeth gyfoes y meddwl, bydd yr ymchwil hon yn darparu ymchwiliad cynhwysfawr i'r pwnc hynod ddiddorol ond yn aml yn cael ei anwybyddu.
Rwy'n parhau i fod â diddordeb bywiog mewn datblygiadau diweddar yn athroniaeth emosiwn, ac yn ehangach mewn meysydd athroniaeth meddwl sy'n poeni eu hunain am ddeall natur bwriadoldeb ymwybodol.
Addysgu
Rwy'n Gymrawd o'r Academi Addysg Uwch.
Cyrsiau UG a addysgir 26-27: Ymdeimlad o'r Posibl
Mae fy swyddfa yn 5.46 (Adeilad John Percival). Cysylltwch am oriau swyddfa.
Bywgraffiad
Astudiais ar gyfer fy ngradd Meistr mewn Athroniaeth ym Mhrifysgol Sheffield a chefais fy PhD o Brifysgol Warwick yn 2016. Rhwng 2017-8, roeddwn i'n ôl-ddoethurol ym Mhrifysgol Johannesburg (Adran Athroniaeth). Rhwng 2018-2021 roeddwn yn gymrawd ymchwil ôl-ddoethurol yr Academi Brydeinig ym Mhrifysgol Manceinion (ar y prosiect 'Emotions as Feeling Towards Value'). Ymunais â'r Adran Athroniaeth ym Mhrifysgol Caerdydd fel darlithydd ym mis Medi 2021
Meysydd goruchwyliaeth
Mae gen i ddiddordeb mewn goruchwylio myfyrwyr PhD yn y meysydd canlynol:
- Canfyddiad (yn enwedig canfyddiad gofodol)
- Ffenomenoleg (hanesyddol a chyfoes)
- Emosiwn a Gwerth
- Bwriad
- Ymwybyddiaeth (yn benodol pynciau sy'n ymwneud â phrofiad ymwybodol)
- Husserl, Sartre, a ffenomenolegwyr clasurol eraill
- Nietzsche
